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Angel Investing: Changing Strategies
During Volatile Times

Jeffrey E. Sohl*
University of New Hampshire

Changing conditions in the angel market offer a unique opportunity to further knowledge and
understanding about angel investing in the US during times of economic volatility. To identify
trends in the angel market, this research examines changes in characteristics and investment
behavior during a time of market expansion and contraction (2000 to 2001). While business
angels remain the leading source of seed capital for business ventures, depressed yield rates and
increased due diligence indicate that investors are retreating to more fundamental approaches.
Introduction
The increase in entrepreneurial activity in the United States during the 1998 to 2000
period was notable in size, scale, and velocity. The critical role of early stage equity financing
in this expansionary period, and throughout the history of the entrepreneurial economy, has
been noted by researchers (Freear and Wetzel (1990); Sohl (1999); Harrison and Mason
(2000)). There are two major external sources of private equity capital for business ventures:
business angels and venture capital funds. Business angels represent the oldest, and largest
source of seed and equity capital for the high growth venture (Harrison and Mason (2000); Sohl
(2003)). Complementary to the angel market is the institutional venture capital market, which
invests primarily in the later stage of a firm‟s development (Timmons and Sapienza (1992);
Meyer et al. (1995); Timmons and Bygrave (1997)). Together, angels and venture capitalists
provide the majority of high risk equity capital for entrepreneurial ventures. During the
expansion leading up to 2000, angel and venture capital investment activity surpassed previous
industry records at unprecedented and unsustainable rates. Total venture capital investments
increased nearly 15 fold in six years, from US$6.3 billion in 1995 to US$90 billion in 2000
(PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001)). The number of deals funded by the venture capital industry
increased less rapidly, from 1,128 deals in 1995 to 5,485 in 2000, a five fold increase, or one*
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third of the increase in the dollars invested. In 2000, angel investments were estimated to be
approximately US$40 billion. For the first time in over a decade, venture capital investment
dollars exceeded those of the angel market (Sohl (2003)). During this expansionary period, the
number of angel portals, categorized by the predominant mechanism for bringing together
entrepreneurs seeking capital and business angels searching for investment opportunities, grew
by more than 60% (Sohl, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)).
The 2000-2001 downturn in the economy, after a period of strong growth, offers a
unique opportunity to further knowledge and understanding of angel investing through a
comparison of activities during the two periods. There is strong evidence that start-up firms
contributed significantly to the long period of economic growth in the 1990s (Progressive
Policy Institute (1999)). The downturn, especially acute in the start-up sector, signified
considerable changes in the early stage equity markets, both for angels and venture capitalists.
The venture capital industry contracted significantly, with 2001 investments falling to US$36
billion (in 3,928 deals), a 60% decline from 2000, and a retraction to 1999 investment levels in
both investment dollars and number of investments (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002). Angel
investments have shown similar declines in terms of dollars invested (US$30 billion in 50,000
deals), but have not declined as sharply in terms of number of investments (Kaiser (2002)).
This expansion and contraction offers a unique opportunity to further knowledge and
understanding about angel investing in the US during times of economic volatility. How and
why the angel market changed offers key insights into some of the contributing factors of early
stage investment resiliency and vulnerability during difficult economic periods. The expansion
and contraction offered both opportunities and challenges and allowed investors to change their
fundamental approach toward private equity financing. Many new, perhaps less sophisticated,
investors entered during the market upswing. Many experienced angels altered fundamental
screening and due diligence methods. As the private equity market began to overheat,
investment activity dramatically increased to levels that proved to be unsustainable. Relaxation
of past risk-reducing methods of diligent proposal analysis seemed to fuel the market upswing,
as well as the eventual fallout. The excessives of the rising market gave investors good reason
to retool their “new economy” approaches and retreat back to the fundamentals. Astute angels
began to rethink their strategies and retrench for the future.
This change in angel investment behavior generates many critical questions. How did
angel groups and investor networks alter their investment strategies since the pinnacle of the
last economic expansion? What methods are employed for deal sourcing by the angel groups
in the post expansion period? Has the angel market entered a more realistic phase with greater
scrutiny by investors and better preparation of entrepreneurs when seeking equity capital? Is
the market expanding or contracting in reaction to the excessives of 2000? With the hope of
improving efficiency in the private equity market, this study aims to answer these questions
through an analysis of the activity of angel portals in 2000 and 2001 and offer insights on the
current state of the business angel market. These two time periods (2000 and 2001) provide an
opportunity to enhance the knowledge of angel investing and to develop an understanding of
early stage investment resiliency and vulnerability during difficult economic periods.
I.

Hypotheses development
Angel investors have been identified as the major source of seed and start-up capital for
entrepreneurial ventures in the US, with investment amounts in the US$100,000 to US$1
million range (Harrison and Mason (2000); Sohl (2003)). The motivation for this seed and
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start-up stage investing is the opportunity to start businesses and play a role in the
entrepreneurial process (Mason and Harrison (1994); Landstrom (1997)) and the chance to act
as an entrepreneur in the investment process (Politis and Landstrom (2002)). Business angels
often act as financial intermediaries assessing of small business quality through a variety of
activities, including screening, contracting and monitoring, and help address broader
information problems inherent to the private equity market (Berger and Udell (1998)).
In the United Kingdom it has been estimated that during the 1999-2000 period, close to
60% of angel investments were at the seed and start-up stage and over 75% of these
investments involved amounts less than US$200,000 (Mason (2001)). More recently, this
threshold for early stage investments during 2000 has been raised to US$500,000 (Mason and
Harrison (2002a)), which is, in part, a reflection of the rise in valuations during the economic
upswing. While the threshold amount is of interest, the role of angels as providers of seed and
early stage risk capital is the focus. In a Canadian study, more than 60% of angel investments
were in the seed or start-up stage (Feeney, Haines and Riding (1999)). The funding importance
of business angels has been even greater in recent years as the venture capital segment has
shifted focus away from start-ups and early stage firms in favor of more mature ventures (Van
Osnabrugge (2000); Sapienza et al. (1996)) and angels have been recognized as occupying a
critical place in the private equity financing spectrum (Brophy (1997); Berger and Udell
(1998); Sohl (1999); Mason and Harrison (2000a)).
While angels have been predominately seed and start-up investors, there is reason to
hypothesize that angels may be participating in later stages at a higher frequency. As venture
capital investments continued to increase in deal size during the study period, a substantial
secondary gap in the private equity market has developed in the $2-$5 million range (Sohl
(2003)). Companies that have successfully secured seed and start-up capital are finding
increasing difficulties in securing follow-on funding. With the venture capital industry needing
to hold funds for additional rounds for portfolio companies and deal size increasing, this
secondary gap is not being filled by the venture capital industry. Further support for the
potential retreat of angels from the seed and start-up market is that first sequence investments
(first time investment in a particular company) by venture capital funds decreased from 41% in
2000 to 24% in 2001 (PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002)), indicating that nearly three quarters of
venture capital investments are in companies that are already in their portfolios. Thus, angels
may be called upon to provide a second round of financing beyond the seed and start-up stage.
The salient question is if this represents a possible restructuring of the angel market, with a
reallocation away from the seed and start-up stage, or an increasing role for angels as both
seed/start-up investors and second round providers of capital. If angels are reacting to this
stage and first sequence migration by venture capitalist, one may expect business angel
investors to shift their strategies toward follow-on investments, and thus reduce their
proportional amount of seed/start-up investments. These trends in the private equity market
lead to the formulation of the first hypothesis:
H1: Business angels continue to invest primarily in the seed and start-up investment stage.
An important component of the early stage equity market is the existence of the funding
gap in the seed and start-up stage (Freear and Wetzel (1990); Mason and Harrison (2000b);
Sohl (2003)). This gap has been interpreted as a consequence of market inefficiency (Wetzel
(1986); Wetzel (1987)) and is in part due to the increase in marginal transaction costs
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experienced by large venture capital firms. The existence of private investors and indications
that capital is available, but quality deal flow is lacking (Mason and Harrison (1994); Sohl
(1999)), suggests that this persistent funding gap is, in part, due to the inefficient flow of
information. In the informal venture capital market, with the suppliers of capital seeking a
degree of anonymity, often in conflict with the need to maintain quality deal flow, information
can flow very inefficiently. Additionally, the significant information asymmetries inherent in
the private equity market highlights the importance of the principle-agent relationship and
allows for significant agency risks, particularly adverse selection problems. Amit et al.‟s
(1990) examination of the implications of this relationship between entrepreneurs and venture
capitalists found that the adverse selection problem created allowed for the less profitable
ventures to be sold to venture capitalists and the more profitable ones to be retained by the
more skillful entrepreneurs. Thus, angels may attempt to overcome these inherent difficulties
with an increased reliance on personal communications with the entrepreneur and the ability to
judge their character through face-to-face communications and interactions in a variety of
settings.
As a means of increasing the efficiency in the angel market and given the growing
availability, and usage, of electronic communication, it has been suggested that the angel
market could benefit through the use of the Internet as a major tool for deal sourcing. Prior to
the last economic cycle, research indicates that electronic networks in the private equity market
had been largely unsuccessful, with less than 1% of equity raised in 1997 being attributed to
on-line sourcing (Private Equity Week (1998)). Also, the angel market has historically been
one that conducts business on a face-to-face level for both deal sourcing (Freear, Sohl and
Wetzel (1994); Coveney and Moore (1998); Reitan and Sorheim (2000); Sorheim and
Landstrom (2001); Günther (2005)) and investment decisions (Landstrom (1992); Fiet (1995a);
Harrison and Mason (2002)). Likewise, angels rely more on the entrepreneur in the investment
decision. Since the investment is in the seed and start-up stage, there is a paucity of financial
history, past performance data and the absence of a track record of growth performance. As
such, angels tend to depend on the entrepreneur to protect them from losses due to market risk
and are thus more concerned with agency risk than market risk (Fiet (1995b)). Thus, the
influence of electronic communication as a method to provide for more efficient investment
proposal evaluations, the impact of agency risk and the adverse selection problem, leads to the
investigation of the process of angel deal sourcing and investing.
H2: Angel deal sourcing and investing remains a face-to-face exercise.
During the surge of investment activity taking place in 2000, there was a general
consensus that this frantic pace may have contributed to less than optimal decision making by
angel investors (Sohl (2003)). Likewise, it is surmised that the post 2000 effect ushered in a
more realistic phase with greater scrutiny by investors and better preparation of entrepreneurs
when seeking equity capital. The expansion and contraction offered both opportunities and
challenges and allowed for fundamental changes in private equity financing for both the supply
(angel) and demand (entrepreneur) side. These changes can best be determined through an
examination of yield rates, due diligence procedures and entrepreneur expectations.
The yield (acceptance) rate is defined as the percentage of investment opportunities that
are brought to the attention of investors (by the angel organization) that resulted in an
investment. Based on data collected on angel investments in Norway from 1995 to 1998, yield
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rates for investment proposals were estimated to be 16.4% (Sorheim and Landstrom (2001)).
In an earlier study of UK angels, yield rates were determined to be 6% (Mason and Harrison
(1994)), although this estimate was based on a sample of only 35 investments by a small group
of angels. The only study to date on US angel yield rates focused on referral efficiency and
determined acceptance rates based on the source of the deal flow (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel
(1994)). In Australia, angel yield rates during the 1990 to 1994 period increased from a low of
12% to a peak in 1994 of 31% (Hindle and Wenban (1999)). In a larger study of Canadian
private investors, the yield was determined to be 11.6%. However, it should be noted that the
average size of Canadian angel investments is at least twice the size of those in the US, which
stems from Canadian securities laws that financially penalize smaller deals (Riding et al.
(1997)). In a study based on angel activity during the market uptake, business angels identified
two important elements in the initial screening stage: the extent to which the proposal meets
their personal investment criteria and the intuitive assessment of the proposal. Although this
stage took only about ten minutes, 27% of proposals resulted in an investment (Mason and
Harrison (2000c)). In a post 2000 study in the UK, over 80% of investment proposals were
rejected due to poor quality (Mason and Harrison (2002a)). While these studies are insightful,
it is argued that these European countries did not experience the volatility of the private equity
markets that existed in the US.
In any discussion of yield rates, it is important to note that both the number of
investment proposals considered (the denominator) and the number invested (the numerator)
play an important role. In hyperactive markets the demand for capital increases as more
entrepreneurs seek to take advantage of both the perceived increase in the supply of private
equity and the increase in the probability to reach liquidity. Liquidity in this context is an exit
through either a merger, acquisition or initial public offering (IPO). Similarly, the supply of
capital is increased through a higher frequency of previously successful exits (which provide a
source of capital for angel investments) and the desire to reach liquidity during current market
conditions. Thus, the demand for capital increases, while at the same time the supply is
increased. The rate of investment also increases as a result of the perceived opportunity for a
profitably and timely liquidity event. The combination of these factors contributes to a possible
increase in the yield rate during times of expansion. Conversely, yield rates during markets
contracting should experience an opposite effect. On the supply side, as contraction in the IPO
and M&A markets decrease the probability of a swift and lucrative liquidity event, capital is
reserved for possible additional rounds of financing for the survival of portfolio companies. In
addition, the decrease in the likelihood of liquidity promotes both a more cautious and more
discriminating approach to investment decisions. Unfortunately, the demand side may not react
as quickly to these market changes. That is, entrepreneurs are still developing ventures based
on the robust expansion of 2000. Compounding this effect is that entrepreneurs are inclined to
present their proposals to more angels, since the prospects for financing are diminished,
requiring a wider search for capital. Further contributing to the conditions effecting the yield
rate is the due diligence process (hypothesis 4). In markets with more scrutiny for the quality
of the venture in the liquidity event, as experienced by the decline of IPOs during the post 2000
period, there is an increased time to conduct this more through due diligence. As such, the
longer it takes the angel investor to conduct due diligence, the smaller the number of
investments that can be reviewed, contributing to a lower yield rate. Thus, pressure from both
the increase in the demand (denominator), the decrease in the supply (numerator) of capital for
new ventures, and the more cautious approach to due diligence, should contribute to a decrease
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in the yield rate. This suggests the following hypothesis for US investment yield rates during
especially unstable periods of economic activity:
H3: Yield rates in the angel market inflate in overactive markets.
In one of the earliest studies of the angel investment process in the US, due diligence is
calculated as the time between the first meeting of the angel and entrepreneur, and the receipt
of the investment funds (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel (1995)). The median elapsed time was 2.5
months for private investors (4.5 months for venture capital funds), with the shorter
deliberation time for due diligence for angel deals being attributed to the smaller number of
people involved in the decision process and the fact that angels tend to invest in fields with
which they are familiar (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel (1995)). In the UK, the time for angels to
conduct due diligence was two months and the research also confirmed that venture capitalists
take longer, for many of the same reasons as outlined in the US study (Van Osnabrugge
(2000)). This length of time to conduct due diligence is commonly used as an indication of the
thoroughness of the due diligence process (Douglas and Shepherd (2002); Mason and Harrison
(2002b)).
Due diligence may be effected by markets experiencing changes in a relatively short
period of time. Many new, perhaps less sophisticated, investors entered during the market
upswing and experienced angels altered fundamental screening and due diligence methods.
Spurred on by the hot IPO market and the increasing competition for deals, the pressure to
make the investments increased and the time devoted to due diligence decreased. Due
diligence appeared to become an after-thought and anecdotes of due diligence completed in
short periods of time began to appear (Sohl (2003)). In the market expansion period, external
signals to the private investor may confound the due diligence process and result in a reduction
in the thoroughness of due diligence. In essence, through the signaling that current market
conditions (robust IPOs with large returns) translate into the perception that the ventures are of
higher quality, then one would take less time to reach the investment decision. The inclination
is to invest, since the opportunities must be good. This is in contrast to the normal assessment
by the private investor that the level of risk is substantial, the chance for failure high, and the
modus operandi being the proposal is not of high quality and due diligence must prove that the
venture can overcome this conception. Thus, in markets that are in contraction, ventures are
deemed to be a lower quality and more time is needed to screen these investment opportunities.
It is surmised that relaxation of past risk-reducing methods of diligent proposal analysis seemed
to fuel the market upswing, as well as the eventual fallout.
H4: Due diligence is more carefully measured during contracting markets.
Angel research has come to the general conclusion that most active business angels are
unable to invest as frequently as they would wish because of a lack of suitable business
proposals (Mason and Harrison (1994); Sohl (1999); Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)).
This has led to a determination that entrepreneurs often are not “investor ready” (Mason and
Harrison (1999)). The main deficiencies that investors note in the proposals are that the
business plans contain unrealistic assumptions or information that is not credible and that the
entrepreneur/management team lacks credibility (Mason and Harrison (2002a); Mason and
Stark (2004)). In general, entrepreneurs appear to be unrealistic in their assumptions of the
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business concept and growth prospects (Mason and Rogers (1997); Feeney et al. (1999); Cassar
(2004)). The main reason cited by UK angels as to why the investment was not made was
because the angel and entrepreneur could not agree on the price (total amount of funding) of the
deal (Mason and Harrison (2002a)). One would surmise that this lack of realism is exacerbated
in hyperactive markets and mitigated in declining markets. One potential measure of the
degree of realism in the entrepreneur‟s search for growth capital is the difference between the
funding sought by the entrepreneur (deal size sought) and the actual amount invested in the
deal (deal size invested) by the angel.
An additional consideration in the examination of the difference between the amount of
funding sought and the amount obtained is the staging of private equity investments. Angels
and venture capitalists employ an assortment of strategies to reduce the significant risks
associated with venture investing, and investment stage considerations can be significant when
evaluating agency risks (Gompers (1995)). Since more information is available in developed
firms, investments in later stage firms seem to reduce agency costs. Staging of investments can
be viewed as a control mechanism to manage these agency costs (Sahlman (1990)). In contrast
to angel deals, venture capitalists arm themselves with a variety of contract previsions and
covenants (Sohl and Areson-Perkins (2001)) and set milestone contingency restrictions on the
incremental amount of committed financing. This staging of capital infusions affords the
opportunity to gather information and assess the ventures progress, while maintaining the
option to abandon the investment (Gompers (1995)). As such, the size of the investment may
be an indication of this staging strategy. For venture capitalists the research indicates that early
stage firms receive significantly less money per round, stage investments as a risk reducing and
monitoring process, and maintain the ability to stop future financing when prospects for returns
are negative (Gompers (1995)). In a market in contraction, one would expect these staging
considerations to play an even more significant role. However, an important consideration is
that angels do not possess the wealth of capital afforded a venture capital fund, since angel
investors are individuals, rather than investment funds. Thus, angels do not necessarily have
the financial resources to spread the investment over several stages. It is possible that angels
will reduce the amount for the initial round and spread the given amount over several tranches
within a round, an event more likely in the angel market.
Thus, the combination of the degree of realism in the entrepreneur‟s search for capital,
the investor ready considerations of the angel investor and the staging of private equity
investment as a risk reducing measure, lead to the development of the following hypothesis:
H5: (Deal size invested - deal size sought) approaches zero in post-hyperactive markets.
II.

Methodology
Previous research has shown that angel investors prefer to invest in groups for an array
of reasons, including the reduction of agency costs and risks, market risks, adverse selection
risks, and transaction costs (Sohl, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)). Prior to the late
1990‟s these angel groups were informal gatherings of angels typically formed on a per
investment deal basis. Since 1998 there has been an increase in the more formal angel groups.
These types of angel groups, or portals, include formal matching services and “named” angel
groups and angel alliances that meet regularly to review investment opportunities. While only
10 recognized angel groups existed in 1996, these ranks have grown to close to 140 in 2000 and
2001. Data for this research was collected from a variety of angel portals that were widely
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disbursed throughout the US. The organizations participating in the study averaged just over
100 angel investors with diverse investing approaches and practices. While not all business
angels source their investments through angel portals, the activity that takes place in and
around these portals is a reasonable representation of angel market behavior. The portals
participating in the study reported a growing number of members. A percentage (25% to 40%)
of this growth includes latent investors who are not actively investing in the years covered by
this research. These novice investors, who lack the extensive social networks, may be attracted
to these organizations because it may enable them to find sufficient deal flow. However, the
active investors, comprising 60% to 75% of the angel organizations, were seasoned investors
significantly contributing to market activity. Additionally, the active investors not only
invested with other members of the organization, they also invest with angels outside of the
organization. As such, it appears that the findings, although based on angel groups, are
representative of the more general angel population.
As a means of portraying activities within the current state of the business angel market
in the US and to test the hypotheses outlined in the previous section, a survey-based approach
was employed. This survey was divided into two sections, the characteristics of the angel
organization and the characteristics of the individual investors that are members of the
organization. The survey was directed towards angel portals, which can be categorized
according to the predominant mechanism for bringing together entrepreneurs seeking capital
and business angels searching for investment opportunities. These mechanisms include formal
matching services that match entrepreneurs with investors through a data base, angel groups
that meet regularly to review opportunities (angel alliances), organizations that facilitate the
angel investment process by organizing meetings or events that bring together both angel
investors and entrepreneurs, and Internet-only networks. The operational practices and
performance were articulated through industry preferences, membership and their participation
rate, yield rates, deal sourcing and related investment activity. Data collected that described
member investor characteristics included stage preference, due diligence procedures,
valuations, deal size and participation by women entrepreneurs and investors. To compare
angel investor‟s approach, activities, behaviors and performance over time, the survey
instrument collected data for years 2000 and 2001. This data collection for the two time
periods was accomplished with one survey instrument. Thus, the longitudinal data represents
data from the same respondents, which facilitates the comparisons across the two time periods.
These two time periods (2000 and 2001) provide an opportunity to develop an understanding of
early stage investment resiliency and vulnerability during volatile economic periods.
A comprehensive questionnaire was distributed to 174 of the known private investor
clubs, angel alliances and matching networks in the US. Each organization was contacted on
multiple occasions and through various mediums. A letter of introduction sent through US
mail was the initial contact. The actual questionnaire followed, also through US mail. For
those organizations that did not respond to the first questionnaire, a second copy of the
questionnaire, accompanied with a letter of encouragement, was distributed. Email messages,
with a copy of the questionnaire attached, were sent to all possible groups who did not respond
to the first two requests. Telephone contact was established with groups who did not respond
to any previous attempts. In most circumstances, either the CEO or lead member of the
management team was the primary contact and the individual who completed the survey. This
participation of high-level management was considered essential in order to assure the accuracy
of the responses.
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Of the 174 organizations, 126 were confirmed to exist. Of these 126, 47 surveys were
returned, representing a response rate of 37%. To access the potential for non-response bias,
non-respondents were contacted. Ten percent of the non-respondents contacted provided
reasons for their non-response. The largest category of non-respondents (80%) was those that
considered that the data requested does not apply to their type of organization. For the
remaining non-respondents, the reasons for non-response included those that do collect data
and were therefore unable to provide the information for the survey (9%) and those that were
no longer active (9%). Any within survey time related non-response bias was also evaluated.
In this contact, the early respondents (the first half of the data for the survey) were compared to
the late respondents (the last half of the respondents). It is surmised that those responding late
to the survey, after a follow-up contact, would be most similar to non-respondents. For each of
the years and responses germane to this research there appeared to be no significant differences
between the responses of these two groups.
The respondents represented a diverse set with respect to geographic location and
organizational structure and as such, the sample appears to adequately represent the
disbursement of angel activity in the US. With respect to organizational structure, 55% of the
respondents are classified as organizations that facilitate the angel investment process by
organizing meetings or events that bring together both angel investors and entrepreneurs, and
36% are considered to be angel groups that meet regularly to review opportunities (angel
alliances). In contrast, 9% are formal matching services that match entrepreneurs with
investors through a data base and none of the organizations can be classified as Internet-only
networks.
This dispersion of the types of angel organizations with respect to the meeting and deal
enactment format is representative of the population of angel portals. A compilation of existing
angel organizations in the US, that is the closest in time to the 2000 and 2001 survey, was
conducted in 1998 (Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)). The research, with respect to the
structure of angel organizations, indicates that 54% of the angel organizations are classified as
organizations that facilitate the angel investment process, 24% are formal matching services,
21% are angel groups, and 1% of the organizations can be classified as Internet-only networks
(Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)). This compilation compares favorably with the
2000/2001 survey results, except for the larger number of angel groups (36% in 2000/2001
versus 21% in 1998) and matching networks (9% versus 24%). However, research indicates
that in the period between 1998 and 2000 there was a marked increase in the number of angel
groups and at the same time a decline in the number of matching networks (Sohl (forthcoming);
Amatucci and Sohl (forthcoming)). Since the sample emulates the structure of the angel
portals, this lends support for the credibility of the results, with respect to angel portals.
The methodology is open to a potential source of bias since individuals that are
members of angel portals or groups may not be representative of the general population of
business angels. There are several reasons to indicate that this potential bias is mitigated. First,
portals are in essence a manifestation of the historical syndication characteristic of the angel
market. Portals were developed as a way to formalize a process that was in existence since the
initiation of the study of angels in the early 1980s (Wetzel (1983)). Second, previous research
indicates that there are few differences between angels that are members of portals and those
who are not (Van Osnabrugge (1998)). Third, to assure a representative sample, the data was
derived from a variety of angel organizations. These organizations include significant
differences with respect to size (number of members), organization structure (highly organized
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with formal bylaws to informal collections of angels), regions (geographical diversity),
investment objectives (sector specific to a wide range of sectors) and age (organizations
founded over a decade ago to those in the last few years). Fourth, to assess the investment
activity of the members of the angel organizations the respondents indicated the percentage of
their angels that are making investments. In 2000, the median percentage of members actively
investing was 70% and in 2001 it was 80%. Thus, active investors comprised the majority of
the members of the angel organizations and were significantly contributing to market activity
with their track record of investment activity. Lastly, angels typically invest with five to seven
other angels as a means to mitigate agency risks, costs and market risks (Sohl, Van Osnabrugge
and Robinson (2000)). As such, the angels not only invest with other members of the
organization, they also invest with angels outside of the organization as a risk reduction
strategy (Sohl, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)).
Another potential bias is that the respondents are the executive directors or presidents of
the angel clubs. In most cases, these administrators are also active investors. In all cases, it is
the role of the administrator to have an intimate understanding of the workings and activity of
the membership. These individuals are responsible for many activities, including organizing
screening committees, assisting in forming investment syndicates, participating in the due
diligence process, assisting in the valuation exercise and tracking the deal. Through a close
working relationship with the members and lead investors, these administrators are in the
unique position to view the activities of the organization through an organizational lens, rather
than the myopic view as an individual investor in a single deal. As such, they are able to
provide detailed activity information from an organizational perspective.
III.

Analysis
A.
Stage and deal sourcing
Seed financing is the relatively small amounts of equity capital provided to an
entrepreneur to prove a concept and to qualify for start-up capital. This capital is often used to
support exploration of a concept before the venture is in operation. Start-up capital typically
enables the venture to proceed from the research and development phase to initial production
and limited sales, including the completion of product development and initial marketing. In
both of these stages there exists a substantial amount of risk, including both the risk of
discovery and the question of whether a cost effective manufacturing process can be
implemented. Angels have traditionally been the largest source of seed and start-up stage
capital in the US, with investments typically below the US$1 million threshold. However,
given the recent volatility and poor investment performance, angels may have been inclined to
retreat from these high risk investment stages. These developments lead to H1: Business
angels continue to invest primarily in the seed and start-up investment stage. Based on the data
collected for 2000 and 2001, there appears to be substantial support for H1 (Table I). The data
indicate that angels, through their membership in angel portals, continue to favor the early
stages, with 51% of the 2000 angel portal investments, and 45% for 2001, in seed and start-up
stage entrepreneurial ventures. This represents the largest stage for angel investment activity.
Further support for H1 can be garnered from complimentary data from the venture capital
industry. In 2000, investments by venture capitalists in the seed and start-up stage represented
3% of the total dollars invested and 8% of the total investments made, and for 2001, 2% of
dollars and 5.1% of deals (PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002)). It should be noted that angel
portal members also indicate a slight increase in later stage investing, up 10% from 2000 to
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2001. Clearly, angels are not retreating from seed and start-up investing, but it appears that
market conditions are requiring angels to provide some follow-on financing for their
investments. First sequence investments (first time investment in a particular company) by
venture capital funds decreased from 41% in 2000 to 24% in 2001 (PricewaterhouseCoopers
(2001)), indicating that nearly three quarters of venture capital investments are in companies
that are already in their portfolios. Thus, angels are often required to provide some additional
rounds of financing, and this is reflected in the slight increase in angel investments in the later
stage.
This preference for seed and start-up investing impacts the process of deal sourcing and
investment decisions. In the informal venture capital market, with the suppliers of capital
seeking a degree of anonymity often in conflict with the need to maintain quality deal flow,
information flows very inefficiently. In addition, the inherent nature of seed investing is one
that has information asymmetries with adverse selection problems and significant agency and
market risk. Also, the lack of a company track record, and the absence of a product, since the
stage is essentially a proof of concept, adds to the information asymmetries, as does the
situation that the major assets of the venture are the intellectual property of the entrepreneur.
These inefficiencies may be an unavoidable consequence of the stage of the market. To
overcome these inefficiencies angels have traditionally relied on personal networks, as stated in
H2, Angel deal sourcing and investing remains a face-to-face exercise. However, given the
increased availability, and usage of electronic communication, it has been suggested that the
angel market could benefit through the use of the Internet as a major tool for deal sourcing.
Also, research has indicated that business angels may have limited access to deal flow relative
to venture capitalists (Fiet (1995b)) and the use of more efficient deal sourcing methods could
allow angels access to a larger pool of deals. To test hypothesis 2, the angel portals categorized
the primary deal sourcing and investment process method that is employed. Clearly, H2 is
supported, and angels remain committed to face-to-face interaction, with 70% of the portals
(Table II) relying on some form of high-touch mechanism as their primary matching method.
Specifically, 38% of the portals utilize venture forums (entrepreneurs making presentations to
groups of investors) and 32% rely on personal networking among angels to both source deals
and enact the investment decision. The prevalence of the venture forum and personal network
process of generating deal flow is testament to the hands-on nature of the angel market and the
importance of the entrepreneur and the management team in the success of these high-risk
ventures. In addition, the venture forums and personal networks offer a degree of vetting of the
deal and thus help to increase the quality, as opposed to the volume, of the deal being offered.
Further support for H2 is evident through the lack of widespread use of the Internet. Only 11%
of the portals indicate the use of the Internet as the primary matching method, and none of the
respondents indicate that they would consider their organization to be an Internet-only
operation. In addition, none of the portals rely on newsletters to transmit deal opportunities.
Since business angels attach a greater level of importance to agency risks than venture
capitalists (Fiet (1995b)) this lends additional support to the more intimate face-to-face nature
of business angel deal activity. Also, since angel‟s screening and deal evaluation is largely
focused on the competencies of the entrepreneur, then interactions that allows for the greatest
amount of primary information gathering about the entrepreneur, such as face-to-face
information exchanges, may be prudent. Although a variety of information technology,
including the Internet, can reduce both transaction and agency costs, it seems that the value
angels still receive from personal interaction with entrepreneurs throughout the deal screening
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and negotiations continues to outweigh the relative inefficiency of this personal
communication.
B.
The investment process
While a rise in investment activity in 2000 may have contributed to less than optimal
decision making by angels, the post 2000 period may have ushered in a more realistic phase
with greater scrutiny by investors and better preparation of entrepreneurs when seeking equity
capital. The expansion and contraction may have provided the foundation for fundamental
changes in private equity financing for both the supply (angel) and demand (entrepreneur) side.
These changes can best be determined through an examination of yield rates, due diligence
procedures and entrepreneur expectations.
The yield (acceptance) rate is defined as the percentage of investment opportunities that
are brought to the attention of investors (by the angel organization) that resulted in an
investment. Considering investment behavior during the height of the investment bubble in
2000, one would expect to see relatively high yield rates during this time period. The data from
this study confirm this perception (Table III). In 2000, the yield rate reached 23.3%, which was
significantly higher than any other year examined. Reviewing statistics for 1997 and 1998,
years preceding the bubble, reveals lower yield rates of 12% and 14%, respectively (Sohl, Van
Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)). As conjectured, after the bubble in 2001, yields dropped to
10.79%. These data appear to support H3, yield rates in the angel market inflate in overactive
markets. In addition, analysis of the yield data reveals that the significant drop in the yield
ratio was caused by pressure from both the numerator and the denominator. In 2001,
investment groups present investors 29% more investment proposals than in 2000, and
investors executed 43% fewer deals than 2000. Thus, pressure from both the increase in the
demand (denominator), the decrease in the supply (numerator) of capital for new ventures, and
the more cautious approach to due diligence (see below), contribute to a decrease in the yield
rate.
The decrease in the actual deal investment activity in 2001 may be the result of a
number of factors, including more patience in the performance of due diligence, a more
measured approach to angel investing, and knowledge gained from the high failure rates of the
post bubble investments. Analyzing the length of time angels spend evaluating deal proposals
may further support these ideas. Survey results indicate that angels spent, on average, close to
an extra month, or 25% more time (Table IV), on performing due diligence in 2001 than they
did in 2000. These data lend support to H4, due diligence is more measured in markets in
contraction. In real time, the average length of time angels spend considering an investment
opportunity has increased from 3.3 months, in 2000, to 4.1 months, in 2001, although this
difference is only partially supported (p value = 0.109). However, relative to other private
equity investors, angels spend the least amount of time in this process (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel
(1995); Van Osnabrugge (2000)). Survey results illustrate that it took venture capitalists and
corporate investors, on average, five and six months, respectively, to close a deal in 2001.
Similarly, both of these groups reported an increase in this time period of one month from
2000. This does not necessarily indicate that angels are less diligent than their venture capital
counterparts, but it may suggest that they are more efficient.
For the demand (entrepreneur) side, one would also expect a retrenching behavior with
more realistic expectations when seeking equity capital from business angels. To gauge this
possible change in expectations, data is collected that reflects the average amount invested, per
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deal, for all the investments enacted by the angel portals in the survey. These data are
compared to the average funding sought by entrepreneurs that presented investment
opportunities to the member angels. It is assumed that major discrepancies between
entrepreneur expectations and investment amounts were either reconciled during the
negotiation phase or resulted in a failure to conclude the investment. It should be noted that in
this instance, this is the one case where data are derived from two different samples, although
the design and implementation of the surveys were close to identical. The respondent profiles
are also similar across these two samples (1998 and 2001) with respect to angel portal
characteristics. Thus, the sample design allows for comparisons to be made, while mitigating
the potential for any bias due to different sample frames or respondent profile characteristics.
In 1998, entrepreneurs, on average, estimated funding needs at the seed and start-up stage to be
US$826,042 and the average dollars invested per deal are US$142,167, representing a
discrepancy of -US$683,875 (Sohl, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000)). In contrast, in
2001, entrepreneurs, on average (Table V), estimate funding needs at the seed and start-up
stage to be US$1,134,375 and the average dollars invested per deal are US$806,042,
representing a discrepancy of -US$328,333, based on the current survey results. There appears
to be no support for H5, (deal size invested - deal size sought) approaches zero in posthyperactive markets. The difference between the deal size invested and deal size sought is not
statistically significant. The supplier of capital and the entrepreneurs seeking investments (the
demand side) appear to not have adjusted expectations from the hyperactive markets of 2000
and earlier. It appears that these angel deals are in need of further calibration. It is of interest
to note that while the focus of this analysis is on the difference between the deal size invested
and the deal size sought, the growth in average dollars invested per deal is substantial. Recall
that 1998 was the initial stages of the expansion of the private equity markets and 2001, even
though a down year, indicates a substantial increase in the dollars invested per deal. It is
important to note that 2001 is a down year in comparison to 2000, but not necessarily compared
to 1998. Data collected in the current sample reveals such. Average dollars invested per year
for 2000 was $934,045. As noted, for 2001 it was $806,042. Thus, the sample reflects this
downturn in the market.
IV.

Conclusion
The expansion of the private equity market leading up to 2000 and the subsequent
downturn in 2001 provides a unique opportunity to increase our understanding of the angel
market through an examination of market activities during this volatile period. How the angel
market characteristics and investment processes changed during this expansion and contraction
was the focus of this research. Regarding the stage of investments, it appears that individual
investors, as members of angel portals, continue to be the major source of seed and start-up
financing for entrepreneurial ventures. In addition, angels are also providing some later rounds
of equity capital, but this slight movement to later stages appears to be more out of necessity
due to a lack of second round capital, rather than a fundamental change in investment attitudes.
The research also supports the continued reliance on face-to-face interaction for deal sourcing
and investing, possibly as a method to mitigate some of the information asymmetries and
agency risk that is inherent in the angel market. The angel investor appears to have reacted to
the post 2000 decline by adopting measured approaches to the investment process. These
include a more cautious approach to due diligence and an increase in the scrutinizing of
investment opportunities, as indicated by the decline in yield rates. It is important to note that
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these changes are in many ways a retreat to the investment fundamentals of the pre-2000 era,
rather than a major restructuring of the industry. In general, the angel market has emerged
from the post 2000 contraction in a relatively healthy state, especially when compared to some
of the severe restructuring experienced in the other components of the private equity market.
While much has been learned from the examination of the angel market during the
recent expansion and contraction in the economy, much remains in question. This research was
one of the first attempts to provide a longitudinal investigation of the angel market, especially
during a time of economic volatility. However, continued longitudinal data collection needs to
be undertaken. Current research, which relies largely on cross sectional analysis, should be
supplemented with longitudinal research. More extensive longitudinal angel research would
allow for trend analysis and provide valuable insights on changing seed and start-up stage
market conditions and angel organizational structure. Thus, while the angel market appears to
have emerged from the 2000-2001 restructuring in a reasonably sound state, continued research
on market conditions is necessary to assure the sustainability of this critical market for seed and
start-up investments in entrepreneurial ventures.
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Table I
Investments by stage (percentage)
2000 2001
seed and start-up
51% 45%
early
39% 34%
later
9% 19%
n
25
26

p value
0.667
0.71
0.308

Table II
Primary matching methods (percentage)
2001
internet
11%
venture forums
38%
newsletter/magazine
0%
personal networking
32%
investor specified
criteria
9%
other
11%
n=47
p value
0.001

Table III
Yield rates (percentage)
n
yield

2000
2001
33
34
23.26% 10.79%

p value
0.001

(Sohl)
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Table IV
Time to evaluate deal proposals (months)
2000
n=
24
mean
3.3
variance
1.95

2001
29
4.1
4.07

p value
0.109

Table V
Deal size invested vs deal size sought
funding sought
1998
n=
24
mean
$826,042
median
$500,000
standard deviation
$902,457
2001
n=
mean
median
standard deviation

deal size difference
24
$142,167 -$683,875
$75,000 -$412,500
$137,226 $736,184

24
24
$1,134,375
$806,042 -$328,333
$1,000,000
$450,000 -$287,500
$1,224,341 $1,175,284 $861,296

p value (mean difference, 1998 vs 2001)

0.1304
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